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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Studies in Anthro-po-Sociology.—Two principal anthropological elements compose the population of Europe: *Homo Europæus* and *Homo Alpinus*, differing in general in height, complexion, and color of hair and eyes, but definitely distinguished on the basis of length of head—the former being dolichocephalic, the latter brachycephalic. Each element has its peculiar aptitudes and tendencies, and the aptitudes and tendencies of a population appear to vary according as it contains a majority of dolichocephalics or brachycephalics. The relations which exist, or seem to exist, between certain anthropological characters and certain social phenomena have been formulated in laws, and the whole constitutes a new science, anthro-po-sociology. Cranial measurements made by the author on a considerable number of pupils in different schools have furnished results of two sorts. First, they simply verify the laws formulated by Ammon and Lapouge on the basis of several thousand measurements. Other results seem to indicate that there exists a relation between the form of the skull and certain tendencies, radical or conservative, in the substance of instruction, and a relation between scholastic success and the absolute dimensions of the skull. The longer cranium seems to coincide either with more energy or with greater intellectual aptitude. Of the anthro-po-sociological laws three in particular are verified by the author's measurements—the law of urban indices, the law of stratification, and the law of intellectual classes with an important restriction. Four tables are given in verification: Table I, urban and rural indices (Saint-Brieuc); Table II, cephalic indices of day-scholars (urban) and boarders (rural); Table III, cephalic indices of pupils and peasants of Saint-Brieuc; Table IV, résumé and proportion of subjects to various indices. Comparing the dimensions of the skulls of the better students with the poorer in the same classes, Table V shows in the classes of science and modern (technical) instruction 62 of the better students with an average index of 82.01, and 156 of the poorer students with an average index of 82.92. Moreover, the absolute dimensions, both breadth and length, are greater in the case of the former. In the classical instruction the case is quite different, Table VI showing the brachycephalics to be at the head of the classes, with both greater breadth and less length of skull, the index being 83.81 to 82.72 for the poorer students. This variation is partially explained by the geographic origin of the classical students from the most brachycephalic region. But there still remains the fact that the dolichocephalics go by preference to the modern instruction and succeed little in the classic. This is to be explained on the general ground of the differences in the tendencies of the two types. "The brachycephalic is the man of tradition." The dolichocephalic seeks action, functioning. His superiority is accentuated in real life, and he attains the highest political, commercial, industrial, or scientific position.—H. MUFFANG, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, November, 1897.

Economic Progress and Social Ethics.—The economic side of life is entirely dominant in society and it constitutes the very basis of the social movement of our epoch. The problem, then, is to discover the formulæ of economic progress and social well-being corresponding to the necessities of our time and the needs of a *partie sociale*. Examining man from the social point of view, but without reference to any existing organization, these formulæ are: (1) "Theoretically, every normal man is obliged to produce, directly or indirectly, and under pain of vital loss, everything that is indispensable to his nutrition, clothing, lodging, protection, and amusement, in quantity and quality appropriate to his temperament, his state of health, the place he

inhabits, and his kind of labor." (2) "The general or average well-being of man can be obtained, especially in our epoch, only by the labor of the capable man utilizing chiefly his force of will, his intelligence, and his power of action over other men and over machines, associated, on the one hand, with that of the man of less capacity acting chiefly as an animated motor, and, on the other hand, with that of the machine." (3) "Theoretically, the time economized in the labor of the total production, due to the intervention of the capable man and the use of machines, ought to be devoted to the instruction of the productively capable," in order that the total production may be increased without increase in the number of men devoted to it. Considering society as it is, however, these economic laws are considerably disturbed. Each actual man does not furnish his quota to the total production, according to the first law. Contrary to the second law, really incapable men are engaged in production because they are capitalists, and capital has a power of action superior even to true productive capacity. Moreover, the evil is often multiplied by capitalistic heredity. The direction of progress in society ought to be such that this evil may be progressively reduced. The practical means to this end is an inheritance tax progressing by generations, with a view to the ultimate elimination of capital transmitted by heredity. The true social party should reject the sentimental formula, "to everyone according to his needs," for the formula of economic progress—to everyone according to his productivity useful to the universal well-being. Passing to the intellectual domain, the first consideration of the social party should be the principle of free inquiry, to seek the positive truth and to reject the arbitrary. In science, religion, and ethics the immediate end should be the gradual extension of the proven or generally accepted body of knowledge in the different spheres to every man according to the degree of his receptivity and by virtue of the time progressively economized in production. The final situation aimed at in the application of the formulæ of the social good and the social evil is the greatest possible material and intellectual equality between men, and in consequence the universal elevation of the average life of man, in which we sum up the whole *morale sociale*.—E. SOLVAY, *Annales de l'Institut des Sciences Sociales*, December, 1897.

Ideal and Positive Science in Sociology.—Today the opinion is general that sociological research should end where truth may only be divined, not demonstrated. But to admit hypothesis and pure reason in sciences such as chemistry, physics, and natural history, which treat of external phenomena accessible to experiment, and not admit them in a subject whose phenomena originate in the human mind and are manifested by a mechanism so complicated as society, is contrary to good sense. That the human mind seeks the hidden realities, inaccessible first causes, is an observed fact proved by the study of every epoch and by the feelings of each people and individual. It is then legitimate, being necessary and natural. De Santis said: "The germs of metaphysics are so alive in the human heart that even the materialists had some." Comte said that positivism signified the insurrection of science against the heart.

True, the principles obtained by ideal science will never reach the certainty of those of positive science. Ideal science exists for particular sciences as well as for science as a whole. Physics comes upon the enigma of *force*, biology to the great mystery of *life*, etc.

Every social phenomenon results from human action, and hence originates in the stimuli which direct human conduct; so it contains the same problems as metaphysics, though presented more concretely. Their solution is of more than philosophical interest. Why is the human conscience growing more altruistic? Why does not the evolution of conscience in various peoples follow the same track? Why does it not advance with the same rapidity? What end will it reach? What is the relation between the social conscience and that of individuals? What is the law of moral progress? These and others are the high problems of ideal science, certainly important for sociology. What are the formulæ of civilization? History cannot tell us, neither can observation, for the perfect civilization does not yet exist. Sociology studies such problems from a special point of view, connecting results with what has been ascer-

tained by positive science. To deny sociology access to this ideal sphere is to keep it inadequate and fragmentary.—VINCENZO TANGORRA, *Rivista Italiana di Sociologia*, September, 1897.

Sociology and Juridical History.—The plodding scholar who turns from his minute and patient historico-juridic investigations will be struck by the abundance of sociological works lately produced. He may comfort himself by thinking that a little truth is better than a gigantic hypothesis. What he makes known may be little, but is never irrelevant or useless. He coöperates in the common work, as the microscopist contributes to natural history. Most sociologists do not recognize the value of his work. Since Darwin and Spencer the savage is their chief material. Historic erudition, minute investigation to wrest from antiquity a small secret, seem to many useless pedantry. Travelers' tales of barbarians, colored by preconceived theories and uncorrected by philology, have been unduly valued. The juridic student believes as firmly as anyone in evolution. He sees it today in the struggle between institutions. He understands the advantage of applying to sociology the methods of natural history, but he has seen with regret a mania for generalizing, a borrowing of terms rather than methods. Juridic history should furnish the bones for reconstructions. We ought not yet to say what society is, much less to describe its future phases. Imitate naturalists. They do not say what a species will be two centuries from now. True, many students of the philosophy of law spread their wings in an atmosphere far from things of this world, while many devotees of sociology, without knowing at all the history of their own country, fancying that great biological principles are enough, confidently declare the past, present, and future of human society. It is time for all to use judgment. True science will gain when the study of human society is begun and continued by a study of facts, in a scientific spirit, with all the means that ethnical, philological, and juridical culture offers. What is lost in extension will be gained in intensity.—N. TAMASSIA, *Rivista Italiana di Sociologia*, September, 1897.

The Sociology of Suggestion.—In a recent volume Nordau has treated the theory of social suggestion in much the same manner as Tarde. His main point is his conception of the genius as exercising the same functions in society as the nerve centers in the individual. Nothing appears to him more delusive than the search for permanent characters in the social mind which is in reality constantly modified by individual minds. Under the term suggestion is put another phenomenon, that of the powerful action of the social environment upon the individual. This seems more easily sustained than the former. The influence of tradition is so great that men seem incapable of adopting a universal language. The fact that the actual leaders of a people are seldom its superior men stands in marked opposition to Nordau's theory of genius suggestion. The explanation of suggestion by a study of hypnotism as merely an exaggerated form is incorrect. The causes of hypnotism are secondary and abnormal in themselves, and do not form the law of normal states. The theory of hypnotism cannot be carried over and applied to unconscious suggestion. The "sense of imitation" is put upon a purely mechanical basis. "In normal conditions the more perfect individual exercises suggestion over the less perfect, but the inverse does not occur." Experience does not favor this doctrine. An explanation of intellectual phenomena is not found in suggestion. Suggestion comprehends only the affective states, whose intensity and duration have no relation to culture, intelligence, or the normal action of the will. A great difference exists between the reproduction of examples (imitation) and the socialization of general inventions. History presents this general law: "A doctrine can conquer the world only by loosing its personal connection with its founder; example operates to maintain small groups of disciples who vanish; the mass adapts the invention to its conditions of life, makes it its own, and renders it sometimes unrecognizable."—*Le Devenir social*, August-September, 1897.

Official Investigation of the George Junior Republic.—The Committee of the New York State Board of Charities on Placing out Dependent Children, after a visit in the summer of 1897 to the George Junior Republic, made a report derogatory to the

latter, which was circulated by the Associated Press, and worked serious injury to the financial support of the republic. As a consequence the trustees appointed a committee to visit the republic and make a report to the trustees concerning the validity of the charges, and also to address a letter on the subject to the state board and to the public. The committee was composed of Professor J. W. Jenks and Professor Benjamin Ide Wheeler, of Cornell University; Professor W. F. Blackman, of Yale University; Professor J. R. Commons, of Syracuse University; Mr. D. M. Osborne and Mr. F. W. Richardson, of Auburn; and Mr. Frederic Almy, of the Buffalo Associated Charities. The substance of the state board's report is as follows: They assert (1) that the children are kept at the republic for only a short time in the summer, and that the plan of self-government was devised solely to keep the youngsters from depredations upon the farmers of the neighborhood; (2) that Mr. George and his family are alone in the experiment, and that they do not grasp the situation in all its bearings; (3) that the financial support is voluntary and inadequate; (4) that there is a total absence of family life among the boys and girls, and a promiscuous "hotel" takes its place; (5) that familiarity with the "police" court and trials of the republic is demoralizing; (6) that sanitary conditions are lacking, and (7) that there is disorder and uncleanness. The final paragraph circulated by the Associated Press was as follows: "That, so far as it has been developed, this effort stands only as an experiment and endeavor to establish, under a police system, respect for and consideration of the rights of others on the part of a miscellaneous community of hitherto neglected juveniles. That, while it takes from the crowded slums of our great cities a few wayward and neglected children needing a change of scene and air, and during a brief period restrains them from trespassing upon the rights of others, it lacks those features which are essential to success and permanence. Without any suggestion of the family, and barren of any educational provisions, which are the foundation upon which all efforts for reform must be based, and upon which ordinary social life is dependent, it stands only as an ingenious effort at temporary restraint. Laying aside all sentiment, and viewing it solely from the standpoint of the practical, your committee feels that it possesses none of the essentials of success."

The committee appointed by the board of trustees of the republic, in a note drafted by Professor Jenks and addressed to the state board of charities, called their attention to the fact, (1) that, while the republic originated as a fresh-air camp, its promoters are now emphasizing continuous residence for two or three years with a gradual elimination of the summer encampment, and that the winter residents now number forty-six. (2) That, while the boys make their own laws, Mr. George controls them actually by suggestion rather than dictation. (3) That the republic should not be judged by the ideals of a reform school, where the superintendent enforces right *actions* in the way of neatness, order, and industry, though those actions may not betoken a corresponding disposition. In the republic the child is expected to acquire his good habits as a result of experience, and, therefore, if the plan is to be fairly tried, the superintendent might properly be censured if the conditions were not the free ones of daily life; that there is a decided improvement in order and cleanliness among the citizens who have been longest in residence. (4) That a school system has been established under the charge of a graduate of Cornell University, and that, while, indeed, larger facilities are needed, the republic does inculcate to a remarkable degree habits of thrift, of self-reliance, of honesty, of self-control, the habits most essential in character. (5) That, while the surroundings lack much from the æsthetic point of view, they are not unsanitary, and there has never been any sign of an epidemic, nor any case of disease, that could be ascribed to local conditions; disinfectants are freely used, and rooms and closets are well cared for. (6) That the police court is not an evil. Familiarity with the ordinary police court is an evil influence, but the pressure of the opinion of one's peers in favor of good order as applied through the courts of the republic is a far more ennobling influence than the infliction of corporal punishment, or of imprisonment by a superintendent. Boys who would brazenly face a police magistrate break down completely under the admonition of a judge of their own. Respect for law and order, and for public officers of the republic, is one of the most noteworthy benefits produced by the system. (7) Family life can never be reached in any

institution outside the family itself. Mr. and Mrs. George have done much to supply this need. In the association of boys and girls not one instance of improper conduct has been observed. The cottage system is being adopted as rapidly as possible, and two buildings are provided for. (8) Another woman of refinement, who would teach the children to set a higher value upon neat clothing, etc., would have a further elevating effect upon their characters. (9) The evils of the republic, while at times serious, are to be ascribed in part to lack of funds; in part to the fact that Mr. George himself, in looking chiefly at the more important matters of the inner life of the children, has at times neglected things that seemed to him of minor importance. But some so-called evils are no evils at all—simply appearances made necessary by the method. (10) That Mr. George's plan is pedagogically sound and should receive a fair trial.

The Place of the Political and Social Sciences in Modern Education.—

The function of education has been rapidly passing in this century from private to state management, and as a result education has necessarily undergone a change both in methods, in spirit, and in point of view. How has this affected the relationship of the social sciences to education and the training for citizenship in the modern free states? I propose this thesis in answer: That the political and social sciences must be used for purposes of education in all its stages, from the university to the kindergarten.

Both the natural and the social sciences have had a hard fight to gain a footing beside the aristocracy of the classics, but it is now being recognized that the study of the external world about us is not only valuable as a means of intellectual discipline, but that no education can be well rounded, complete, or in harmony with actual life conditions which does not, from the beginning, systematically study the world about us. This is especially necessary in a political society such as the United States. Ancient Greece, modern England, and Germany, though constitutionally governed, yet act upon the general theory that there is a certain class in the communities set apart by heredity, wealth, or social position to hold the controlling influence in the political acts of the society.

We have thrown that theory overboard entirely. We act on the theory that every man—perhaps soon every woman—is not only honest and patriotic, but capable of forming an opinion upon the complex political problems of today. This government cannot succeed unless the individual has some training for his destiny. It must be done also to create an interest in public affairs. It must be done in the lower grades and high schools, as well as the colleges, for few of the masses enter the high school even, *very* few the college; yet they are voters. These studies also will, perhaps, be found equal or superior to mathematics and the classics as mental discipline; and they are vastly superior to the classics in fitting men to understand and adjust themselves to the world they live in. It is a hopeful sign that some of the universities are planning departments of politics and of commerce, placing them at last upon an equality with law and medicine.—E. J. JAMES, *Annals American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1898.

The Bearing of the Doctrine of Selection upon the Social Problem.—

Adam Smith felt in 1776 that it was necessary, in view of the feeling among the upper classes, to adduce arguments to show that the improvement in circumstances of the lower ranks of the people need not be regarded as a disadvantage or an inconvenience to society. It is unnecessary to point out the great contrast which this incident illustrates in the public sentiment of the two centuries, the eighteenth and nineteenth. The "fellow feeling" now existing among men does much to substantiate the claim that the problem of well-being is one which belongs peculiarly to the present time. The discontent of the masses with their lot, whether well or ill-founded, it is not our purpose to inquire; but it is receiving sympathy and attention by the intellectual and better-to-do classes as never before; and it may be worth while to ask what considerations should determine our attitude towards the social problem. The law of selection is not indeed the only, nor even the main, determinant of one's attitude towards God or man. The application of the principles of the "survival of the fittest" is per-

haps done a little more cautiously than formerly; but it is a question whether we have yet, for purposes of social study, exhausted the significance of the "selective slaughter." The selective process has been altered and modified, but it is nevertheless still operative. The lower we get in the social scale, the more pitilessly do we find it operating, as is shown by the high rate of mortality and the short duration of life among the submerged tenth. The "unfit" do perish from inadequate food, shelter, and care. The physical struggle has merely been replaced by one of wits. The Malthusian principle cannot be put aside by sentimental talk of God not making men without providing for them. The bearing of the selective principle is:

First, it precludes all optimistic anticipations for the future of society. Calm study of history forbids the hope of the millennium's coming right away. We can at best only hope that the substitution of a struggle for domination for that of the struggle for existence may lessen the virulence and bitterness of the struggle.

Secondly, the selective principle, on the other hand, in its persistence in society sanctions no fatalistic attitude towards social betterment. In the domain of social life there is no rigid boundary between the cosmic process and the ethical process, between the cut-throat struggle for existence and the elevated struggle for domination, between the natural body and the spiritual body, between the flesh and the spirit.

We may hope to push back the barbaric struggle for existence, but it can never be utterly eliminated. The spectacle of magazined grain beside starving thousands may stir one's indignation; but if the burst of feeling cause us to lay aside the distinction between the property rights of the prudent, industrious citizen for the benefit of the idle, improvident man, then so much the worse for the idle and improvident in the long run, as well as for society as a whole. It is best for all that the control of property be left with those who have shown themselves best able to control it, by getting it in the competitive struggle. Nations no more than individuals can afford to neglect this law. It may be best that the American nation should intervene in the Cuban war, but we should not let sentiment urge us on if reason and facts show that such intervention is contrary to this principle. So long as force settles things in this world, this principle cannot be safely ignored for mere ideals.—WINTHROP MORE DANIELS, *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1898.

The Ultimate Law of Social Evolution.—To discover the fundamental law of life and society is the highest problem of sociology. I affirm that this law is *adaptation*, but I mean a process much more complicated than is generally understood by biologists and sociologists. In the book, *Le Basi del Diritto e dello Stato*, I have unfolded my theory, which explains better than any other the facts of human society. I compare here my theory with others: (1) Lamarck perceived the two chief factors in adaptation, the influence of surroundings as cause of modifications, and the transmission by heredity of modifications. He overlooked a third factor, natural selection. (2) Darwin believed natural selection to be the only one. The true theory includes both these processes, the direct and the indirect, Lamarckism and Darwinism. Besides, Darwinian sociologists have overlooked such other factors as the degenerating process, important in social evolution since, in the struggle for life among men, the vanquished are not exterminated, but spared by the victors, who try to make use of them and to live at their expense. So an *artificial* selection has been at work. (3) I accept the Spencerian formula of evolution, but it expresses only the external fact of becoming, never the specific cause by which things become. Spencer fell into a grave error in supposing that the nature of groups must be that of their individual elements. Again, forgetting that mechanical and biological processes cannot guide us in the richer and more complex social processes, Spencer, instead of studying directly human groups, affirms that society is an entity with phenomena of growth, structure, and function analogous to those of an animal, and that, therefore, the latter are the key to the former. He confuses human organizations with biological organisms. (4) Comte starts from mankind, not, like Spencer, from the individual, but makes the mistake of considering mankind as a single man who lives and learns continually. Hence Comte sees but one side of the immense social process. But history and observation

show us men in groups ; these groups varying, multiplying, struggling with each other, coalescing, or melting away. Sociologists should study the action of these groups upon each other. Besides, in the rudimentary knowledge of biology and psychology of his time Comte could not form a clear idea of adaptation. (5) Bastian maintains more decidedly than Comte that social evolution is determined only by intellectual evolution, and in his researches he was not guided by the law of adaptation. (6) Lilienfeld, Novicow, and others have carried the analogico-organic theory to fantastic lengths. Lilienfeld declared that sociology cannot be a positive science unless it considers society as "a real living organism composed of cells as are individual organisms in nature." Novicow does not hesitate to say that "as societies are organisms, one can deduce *a priori* that they will conform to all the laws of biology." Whether the individual or the family is the social cell, whether government is the brain of the social organism, etc., they cannot agree, thus showing that the analogy is not real. (7) Durkheim's idea of the division of labor I accept, but only as a secondary factor in adaptation. (8) Tarde overestimates the extent and importance of the laws of imitation. (9) Gumplowicz says that mankind came originally from various stocks, and that the social process is due to the eternal sympathy between like stocks and the eternal hatred between unlike ones. But it remains to be proved that men descend from various stocks. How does he know that like stocks are always sympathetic? He maintains not only absolute fixity of species, but even of men's faculties and feelings. Then there could never be progress. As all present human races are amalgamations, how does Gumplowicz know what were the original tendencies of primitive ethnic elements? Again, if there be this instinctive repulsion, why should nations amalgamate? He says, "because the council of the gods has so decided," "because nature wills it." How does he know? (10) My theory is incompatible with his. I maintain transformation, by adaptation, of faculties and sentiments ; that the struggle between men depends on insufficiency of means to support life and on other social circumstances ; that this struggle is lessening ; that between victor and vanquished rises a parasitic relation, governed by certain laws ; that this relation tends to cease ; that with the accumulation of experience and goods men improve their condition ; that in this amelioration groups of men advance by tortuous ways, now receding, now standing still ; and that political power rises independently of the superposition of one people on another.—M. A. VACCARO, *Rivista Italiana di Sociologia*, November, 1897.

The State Adoption of Street Arabs.—The paupers and criminals of the future are to be seen in the children of the slums today, in process of training by the influence of vice and squalor around them. The state has done much of a remedial nature, almost nothing of a preventive sort. Private philanthropy has done what has been done. But private organization is pitifully inadequate ; the law now protects the child from cruelty, but not from the vice of its surroundings. The state should place children who are in reality homeless in country industrial schools, fitting the girls for domestic servants and trades, and the boys for trades and the army and navy. It will not injure the liberty of the individual any more than is already done by the prisons and workhouses which are found necessary for the same children after they have matured in their lives of vice and pauperism. If the children are taken in hand and thus reared when quite small, it will, as the results of the private industrial schools have shown, result in saving the vast majority from useless and sinful lives to be useful and honest men and women. Even financially there will be a great saving after a few years in the cost of paupers and criminals ; and the nation will be strengthened especially in the case of domestic servants and in supplying men for the army and navy, in all of which the dearth is at present a serious problem.—MRS. A. SAMUELS, *Fortnightly Review*, January, 1898.